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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
combination of federal and state enactments. The following specific
changes in the law are therefore recommended:
(1) A federal statute requiring the acceptance or rejection of
federal elective office immediately on accrual of eligibility therefor in
the absence of sickness or other legitimate disability.
(2) A state statute or constitutional provision declaring a
vacancy in the office of one to whom a right to take a second incom-
patible office has accrued and which second office has not been
declined.
(3) A state statute or constitutional provision vesting the power
to fill vacancies in elective state offices in one authority regardless of
whether the Legislature is in or out of session. 69
Unless some such effective safeguards are provided to cover these
gaps in the existing law relative to filling vacancies in public offices,
a recurrence of difficulties such as occurred in the Javits and
La Follette cases is to be anticipated.
THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Introduction
Within the past two decades, a defense formerly interposed
rarely has been pleaded with increasing frequency in the federal
courts. Due to the tremendous growth of federal police legislation
enacted during this period, it has become a recognized fact that a few
unlawful practices are encouraged and condoned by a large class of
-citizens. As a result, federal police officers have found it necessary
oto.resort to various artifices in order to enforce.the law and punish
its violation. Nevertheless, the primary duty "of a law enforcement
officer is to prevent, not to punish crime.1 Therefore, where the
criminal design does not originate with the accused but is conceived
in the mind of a government official, the accused may validly claim
the defense of entrapment.
The classic and most frequently cited definition of entrapment
is that formulated by Supreme Court Justice Roberts in the case of
S69 In the close of the legislative session, the Legislature passed a bill [A. Int.
No. 2830] providing that if a vacancy occurs in the offices of Attorney General
or Comptroller, while the Legislature is not in session, the duties of the office
will be filled by a deputy until the Legislature can meet and appoint a successor.
' See Newman v. United States, 299 Fed. 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1924); Butts
v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921).
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Sorrells v. United States: 2 "Entrapment is the conception and plan-
ning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commis-
sion by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery,
persuasion or fraud of the officer." 3 Court decisions vary as to the
basis upon which to rest the doctrine. The greatest number apply
the theory that it rests upon sound public policy, a policy which re-
quires that convictions should not follow when government officials,
whose duty it is to detect and prevent crime, instead create crime
for the purpose of prosecuting an offender. 4 Other courts have al-
lowed the defense of entrapment on the ground that thle government
is estopped by the conduct of its agents to contend that the defendant
is guilty. A New York State court has taken the position that there
is nothing ethically or legally wrong with obtaining a conviction
through entrapping methods.
6
Formerly, the defense of entrapment would only arise if the de-
fendant could allege that the criminal nature of his act was vitiated
by the consent of the injured party.7 A few familiar illustrations of
this type of entrapment, arising in the state courts, will suffice to
distinguish these situations from those in which a statute has literally
been violated but the plea of entrapment bars prosecution by the gov-
ernment. In the first case a property owner, endeavoring to appre-
hend a suspected thief, solicits the accused to steal his goods. The
court will rule that since the taking is not against the will of the
owner, no crime has been committed, and hence the defendant cannot
be convicted.8 In a prosecution for conspiracy to rob a train, evi-
dence was introduced to show that a detective, employed by the
railroad, induced the defendant to participate in the robbery. The
court held that since the railroad company had assented to the rob-
2287 U.S. 435 (1932).
3Id. at 454 (concurring opinion).
4 See, e.g., Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928) (dissenting
opinion) ; United States ex reL. Hissel v. Mathues, 22 F.2d 979 (E.D. Pa. 1927) ;
Sam Yick v. United States, 240 Fed. 60, 67 (9th Cir. 1917) ; Woo Wai v. United
States, 223 Fed. 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1915).
G See, e.g., O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 1931).
6"Even if inducements to commit crime could be assumed to exist in this
case, the allegation of the defendant would be but the repetition of the pleas
ancient as the world, and first interposed in Paradise: 'The serpent beguiled
me and I did eat.' That defense was overruled by the great Law giver, and
whatever estimate we may form, or whatever judgement pass upon the char-
acter or conduct of the tempter, this plea has never since availed to shield crime
or give indemnity to the culprit, and it is safe to say that under any code of
civilized, not to say christian ethics, it never will." Board of Comm'rs v.
Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. 1864). See also People v. Mills, 178 N.Y.
274, 289, 70 N.E. 786, 798 (1904); People v. Shacher, 47 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372
(N.Y.C. Magis. Ct 1944).
7 See CLARK AND MARSHALL, CaMEs § 155 (5th ed. 1952).
8 People v. Frank, 176 Misc. 416, 27 N.Y.S.2d 227 (City Ct. of Utica 1941).
See also People v. Mills, 178 N.Y. 274, 70 N.E. 786 (1904). (The rule was
recognized but it was held that it does not apply where the object taken was
public property.)
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bery there was no trespass and therefore no larceny. In answer to
the contention that it was not for the larceny but for the conspiracy
that the defendant was indicted, the court reasoned that since the act
done would constitute no crime there could be no prosecution for a
conspiracy to commit the act.9 A final illustration involves a prose-
cution for burglary. A home owner, suspecting that his house would
be burglarized, opened a door to facilitate the defendant's entry. The
court held that since there had been no breaking, there had been no
burglary and hence the defendant was acquitted.' 0
In all of these cases the true objection to a conviction rests upon
the failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie crime. One
of the essential elements of the crime charged in the indictment is
lacking and it is therefore immaterial whether the entrapping party
be a government official or a private citizen."
Entrapment in its more familiar connotation can only be pleaded
when the entrapping party is.a member of a law enforcement agency
or is one of its agents. Essentially, it consists of the contention that
the intent to commit the crime originated with a government agent
and not with the accused.
Elements of the Defense of Entrapment
In every entrapment situation, the greatest difficulty is encoun-
tered by the court when it seeks to answer the question-did the
intent to commit the crime originate with the government agent or
with the accused? 12 As an aid to discovering the origin of the
criminal act, some courts inquire into the general reputation of the
accused,'13 and into his connections with prior illegal transactions. 14
Evidence is sometimes admitted to show that the entrapping officer
had -reasonable grounds for" believing that the accused was a crim-
inal,15 and even the good faith of the officer has been held to be a
9 Connor v. People, 18 Colo. 373, 33 Pac. 159, 160 (1893). -The court said:
"It is therefore evident that the crime is not committed when, with the consent
of the owner, his property is taken, however guilty may be the taker's purpose
and intent."
10 See Love v. People, 160 Ill. 501, 43 N.E. 710 (1896) ; People v. McCord,
76 Mich. 200, 42 N.W. 1106 (1889) ; Bird v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. 96, 90 S.W.
651 (1905).
11 See Anderson, Some Aspects Of The Law Of Entrapment, 11 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 187, 198 (1942).
12 See O'Brien v. United States, 51 F2d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 1931) ; Gargano
v. United States, 24 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1928) ; Capuano v. United States, 9 F.2d
41, 42 (1st Cir. 1925) ; People v. Bradford, 84 Cal. App. 707, 258 Pac. 660, 662
(1927).
13 See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 440-41 (1932) ; DeMayo v.
United States, 32 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1929).
14 See Newman v. United States, 28 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 279
U.S. 839 (1928) ; Silk v. United States, 16 F.2d 568, 569 (8th Cir. 1926).
'1 See Swallum v. United States, 39 F.2d 390, 393 (8th Cir. 1930) ; Rossi v.
United States, 293 Fed. 896, 898 (8th Cir. 1923).
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factor negating the defense.' 6 However, the mere fact that trickery
has been practiced and -an opportunity offered by the government
agents for the commission of the crime does not defeat the prosecu-
tion.'7  An offer to buy narcotics by agents in disguise has been
deemed permissible.' 8 The normal -coaxing by an alleged liquor
purchaser, 9 the common symptoms displayed by a drug addict,20 the
gaining of the confidence of a potential vendor by dressing as an
ordinary laborer 21 or a statement that a friend of the defendant has
sent the officer 22 have been held legitimate. The ultimate goal of
this permitted activity is to reveal the criminal design or to expose
the illegal conspiracy and thus to disclose the would-be violator of
the law." But any inducement that might overcome the reluctance
of an innocent citizen, such as pleas of desperate illness, 24 offers of
great sums,2 5 continued and persistent coaxing 2 6 or "any effective
appeal made by agents to the impulses of compassion, sympathy, pity,
friendship, fear, or hope, other than the ordinary expectation of
gain and profit incident to the traffic, introduces the issue . . . of
entrapment .... , 27
History of Entrapment
Entrapment as a defense has long been recognized by federal
and state courts.28  Prior to the case of Woo Wai v. United States,29
it was rarely used except in cases where lack of consent was an
element of the crime.30 More recently, however, due to the creation
by statute of many new crimes governing the sale and transportation
of liquor and narcotics, the cases in which entrapment by government
16 See Billingsley y. United States, 274 Fed. 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1921).
17 See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932) ; Grimm v. United
States. 156 U.S. 604 (1895).
Is See Vamvas v. United States, 13 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1926), overruled on
other grounds, Ballerini v. Aderholt, 44 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1930) ; C. M. Spring
Drug Co. v. United States, 12 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1926); Perez v. United
States, 10 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1926).
19 See United States v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429 (N.D. Ga. 1925).
20 Id. at 430.21 See United States v. Washington, 20 F2d 160 (D. Neb. 1927).
22 See United States v. Smith, 43 F2d 173 (S.D. Tex. 1930).
23 See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1932).
24 See Driskell v. United States, 24 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1928).
21 See United States v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429 (N.D. Ga. 1925).
20 Woo Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
27 See United States v. Washington, 20 F2d 160, 163 (D. Neb. 1927).
28 See, e.g., Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921); United
States v. Eman Mfg. Co., 271 Fed. 353 (D. Colo. 1920); State v. Mantis,
32 Idaho 724, 187 Pac. 268 (1920) ; People v. McCord, 76 Mich. 200, 42 N.W.
1106 (1889).
29223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
30United States v. Whittier, 28 Fed. Cas. 591, No. 16688 (C.C.E.D. Mo.
1878); Connor v. People, 18 Colo. 373, 33 Pac. 159, 160 (1893); Rex v.
Mcdaniels, 1 Fost. 121, 128, 168 Eng. Rep. 60, 63 (1755).
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officers has been recognized as a defense have grown to an amazing
total.31 -Because the "injured' party in these transactions are loathe
to complain to law enforcement agencies, evidence of violations are
almost impossible to obtain. For this reason, artifice and stratagem
are necessary for effective enforcement. 32  Although much diversity
of opinion existed at the intermediate appellate level, the Supreme
Court repeatedly denied certiorari to entrapment cases, preferring
evidently that each circuit decide for itself whether or not the defense
of entrapment was available to a defendant in a federal court.M
In 1932, the Court granted certiorari and defined the doctrine
in the case of Sorrells v. United States.3 4  Sorrells, indicted for vio-
lation of the National Prohibition Act, entered a plea of not guilty
and upon his trial relied upon the defense of entrapment. 35 The
evidence showed that a prohibition agent, while posing as a tourist,
called at the home of the defendant.' The agent twice requested the
defendant to procure some liquor for him but the defendant stated
that he had none. During their conversation it was discovered that
both were war veterans and that both had served as members of the
same unit. After a further exchange of war reminiscences, the agent
once again renewed hig request, whereupon the defendant left his
house and returned shortly with some liquor which he sold to the
agent. Evidence was introduced to prove the good character of the
defendant; and, in rebuttal, testimony was given that the defendant
was generally reputed to be a "rum runner." 36 No evidence was
adduced, however, that the defendant had in fact previously violated
the liquor laws. The trial court refused to direct an acquittal or to
submit the issue of entrapment to the jury, ruling that as a matter
of law there was no entrapment.37 The Supreme Court held that
the evidence of entrapment was sufficient to warrant consideration
by the jury. Supreme Court Justice Hughes, speaking for five mem-
bers of the Court, held that entrapment is a defense under the general
issue because a sale of liquor induced by methods amounting to an
entrapment is not a crime'Within the purview of the Prohibition
Act.3 8  While it is true that the general language of the act was
31 See O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674, 678 n.1, 678 (7th Cir. 1931).
3? See Coninent, 2 So. CAIjF. L. Rnv. 283, 284 (1929).
33 See Sorrells .v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 443 (1932) ; Leon v. United
States, 290 Fed. 384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 710 (1923); Zucker v.
United States, 288 Fed. 12 (3d Cir.), "cert. denied, 262 U.S. 756 (1922);
Smith v. United States, 284 Fed. 673 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 617(1922); Billingsley v. United States, 274 Fed, 86 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 257
U.S.656 (1921); Fetters v. United States, 260 Fed. 142 (9th Cir. "1919).'
"34'287 -U.S. 435 (1932).
35 Sorrells v. United States; 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
36d. at 440-41.
37 Id. at 452.
-38 Id. at 448. The G6vernment had contended that the defense of entirap-
ment inust-be pleaded in bar to further proceedings under the indiciment and
could not be raised under a plea of -not guilty.- The Court however declared
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broad enough to permit a conviction obtained through entrapping
methods, the Court evidently decided that they would not attribute
to Congress an intent to accomplish a result contrary to what seemed
to be the sound policy unless specific and unequivocal language at-
lowed no other interpretation.3 9 Under this doctrine it cannot be
said that an accused, though guilty, may go free, but rather that the
Government cannot be permitted to contend that the defendant is
guilty of a crime where the government officials are the instigators
of his conduct.40 Although the Court intimated that on certain occa-
sions, the instigation of the Government will be excused, no attempt
was made to formulate a general rule setting forth these exceptions.
Rather, the Court pointed out that: "The predisposition and crim-
inal design of the defendant are relevant." In any event the
controlling question becomes "whether the defendant is a person
otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking to punish for
an alleged offense which is the product of the creative activity of
its own officials." 41
Sorrells Doctrine as Applied in Later Cases
Such a nebulous standard obviously required a more definitive
statement from the courts. The only instance however in which a
court has attempted to formulate a general rule was the case of
United States v. Becker,42 where three excuses for the inducement
were suggested. They were: "an existing course of similar criminal
conduct; the accused's already formed design to commit the crime
or similar crimes; his willingness to do so as evinced by ready
complaisance." 43 Although many cases involving entrapment have
been decided subsequent to the Becker case, the opinions have usually
been limited to discussions of the evidence then at bar; any attempt
at a generalization has been avoided. The inevitable result has been
an uncertainty that is undesirable if it can be avoided.44
To illustrate this confusion, let us examine carefully tvo cases
recently decided by the Second Circuit of the United States Court
of Appeals. Both involved violations of the Narcotics Act 45 and
that the Government could not be permitted to contend that a defendant was
guilty where government officials are the instigators of his conduct. Id. at 452.
39 "The Congress by legislation can always, if it desires, alter the effect ofjudicial construction of statutes. We conceive it to be our duty to construe
the statute here in question reasonably, and we hold that it is beyond our pre-
rogative to give the statute an unreasonable construction, confessedly contrary
to public policy, and then to decline to enforce it." Id. at 452.
40 Id. at 452. See text at note 2.
41 Id. at 451.
42 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933).
43 United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d Cir. 1933).
44 United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952) (dictum).
4535 STAT. 614 (1909), 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1952). (Narcotic Drugs Import
and Export Act),
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in both the defendants claimed entrapment by government agents.
In the first, United States v. Sherman,46 the defendant appealed from
a conviction under an indictment in three counts, each charging him
with violations of the Narcotics Act, i.e., that the accused "'did re-
ceive, conceal, sell and facilitate the transportation, concealment and
sale' of heroin." 4 7 The evidence proved beyond dispute that
Sherman, the accused, on three separated occasions had sold heroin
to an informant employed by the Bureau of Narcotics " 'to go out
and try to induce a person to sell narcotics.' "48 The decoy and
the defendant became acquainted at the office of the doctor where
both were undergoing treatment to rid themselves of their addiction
to drugs. After several meetings the defendant was asked if he
could procure any narcotics for the decoy. Defendant replied that it
would be difficult, but on three occasions he obtained a quantity
which he shared without profit. The issue of entrapment was sub-
mitted to the jury and a conviction was obtained. On appeal, how-
ever, the court expressed the opinion that a verdict should have been
directed in favor of the defendant though the judgment was reversed
on other'grounds.
49
The second case, United States v. Masciale, °0 decided recently
in the second circuit, upheld a jury verdict rejecting the defense
of entrapment. In December 1953 Kowel, an informant, was in-
formally employed by an agent of the Bureau of Narcotics as a
"special employee" to help uncover narcotics "pushers." Kowel
introduced the agent to the defendant, representing the agent to be
a "buyer of narcotics in large quantities." The defendant told the
agent that he "was primarily a gambler and that he was not a nar-
cotics trafficker as such, that his business ... [was] mostly gambling
but that he knew the right- people in the narcotics traffic. . ... 11
Through admitted inducements by the government agents, the de-
fendant arranged a meeting with a narcotics dealer; and six weeks
after the initial meeting the sale that the defendant was charged
with took place.
The majority opinion, to a great extent, relied upon dicta
found in the Sherman case for their decision. The court ruled that
sufficient evidence was produced to satisfy the jury that the " 'accused
was ready and willing to commit the offence charged, whenever the
opportiznity offered itself' " and also that the defendant " 'did not
need any persuasion, but that he stood ready to procure heroin for
any one who asked for it.'" 52"
46 200 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1952).
47 United States v. Sherman, 200 F2d 880, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1952).4 8 Id. at 881.
49 Id. at 883.
50 236 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1956).
5" United States v. LMasciale, 236 F.2d 601,.602 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. granted,
352 U.S. 1000 (1957).52 Id. at 603. The court used these phrases, quoted from the Sherman case,
[ VOL. 31
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It was pointed out in both the Masciale case and Sherman case
that when the issue of entrapment is raised, two questions of fact
arise: (1) did the agent induce the accused to commit the crime?
(2) if so, was the accused ready and willing, without persuasion,
to commit the offence? On the first question the accused has the
burden of proof; on the second, the prosecution has it.53
In both the Masciale case and in the Sherman case, the induce-
ment by the Government to commit the crime was conceded. The
prosecution was now burdened with the obligation to prove that the
accused was "ready and willing, without persuasion to commit the
offence." 54 It is significant to note that although it vas proven in
the Sherman case that the defendant ,was a drug addict, the court
found that the Government had not met its burden of proof. The
court ruled that the conviction could not stand, and refused to place
any great significance upon the fact that the defendant was a drug
addict because there was "no evidence that he was in the habit of
dispensing heroin, any more than his habit of buying it illicitly for
himself. . ... 55 Nevertheless, the court found that Masciale,.who
had never been guilty of illegal dealings in narcotics, who had never
been a drug addict and who needed six weeks to produce a single
ounce of heroin was ready and willing to commit the offense charged
whenever the opportunity offered. In distinguishifig the Sherman
case the court said: "In the Sherman case; it is true, it was held
that the prosecution had failed to prove a valid reply to the defence
of entrapment. In the case at bar, however, the evidence against
the defendant is palpably stronger." 56 It is submitted that an ob-
jective comparison of the' facts would reveal no such evidence that
is "palpably stronger." Rather, it would seem that upon the facts
the decision in the Masciale case conflicts with the decision in the
Sherman case.
Circuit Judge Frank in a dissenting opinion upholds the de-
fense upon another theory. The Sorrells case is interpreted by him
to mean: "Only if the defendant's condiwt justifies the belief that,
without persuasion by a gov'ernment officer, the defendant would
have committed that crime or a substantially similar crime, is that
persuasion valid... ." , 57 In other words' entrapment is always a good
as a basis of comparison which would determine whether or not a case of en-
trapment had been proven.
53 United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952).
54 Ibid.
rz Id. at 883.
56 UAited States v. Masciale, 236 F.2d 601, 603 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. granted,
352 U.S. 100 (1957).
57Id. at 604. He 4dded: "[1it is then and then only proper as a means
of obtaining evidence of a crime, like that which would have occurred in any
event, but which might have been difficult to detect other than by setting a
trap, for 'artifice and strategem may be employed to catch those engaged in
criminal enterprises.'" (emphasis added). Ibid.
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defense if the defendant can prove that he has not been guilty of
similar illegal conduct. At first glance it would seem that Judge
Frank has taken a novel 'position in direct conflict with earlier
authorities. However, a closer look at these authorities at this point
will prove otherwise. It will be remembered that United States v.
Becker is traditionally cited as setting forth three excuses for an
inducement by government agents.65 A closer examination of the
case reveals that the court painstakingly pointed out that it was
merely reciting excuses accepted by other courts to that date. 9 In
deciding the case at bar the court said: ". . . we do not wish to
commit ourselves to the doctrine that mere readiness is enough ....
Even though only those may be induced to commit crime who.are
already so engaged, it would be a narrow limitation to require that
the crime charged should formally be the same." 60 The Sherman
case is cited by the majority in the Masciale case as setting 'forth
the rule that the prosecution could discharge its burden by showing
that "'the accused was ready and willing to commit the offence
charged, 'vhenever the opportunity offered.' " 61 Judge Frank con-
tends that the majority by reading these expressions out of their
context have misconstrued the interpretation given to the Sorrells
case. 62  In the Sherman case, it will be remembered the court of
appeals reversed the decision of the trial court finding that no en-
trapment had been shown.63 They found that there was no evidence
that the defendant was in the habit of dispensing heroin and that
it would have been proper for the judge to grant a directed verdict.
However, they said: "We need not . . . decide that the refusal to
direct a verdict required a dismissal of the indictment . . . upon a
new trial there may be other evidence of Sherman's dealings in
narcotics." 04 Certainly an inference that the defense of entrapment
58 See text at note 41 supra.
59 See United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933). The court
said: "It has been uniformly held that when the accused is continuously en-
gaged in the proscribed conduct, it is permissible to provoke him to a particular
violation which will be no more than an instance in a uniform series. This.
as already appears, was certainly implied in Sorrells v. United States; it gives
the least scope to the doctrine. If it should eventually become settled in that
form, an accused who raised the issue, would indeed open himself to an inquiry
into his past conduct, but that might be more tolerable than to try out the basis
of the officials' suspicions, or the accused's 'predisposition' to the crime laid.
At any rate, it is as far as we need go here. Id. at 1008.
60 Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).
61 United States v. Masciale, 236 F.2d 601, 603 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. granted,
352 U.S. 1000 (1957).
62 Id. at 606 (dissenting opinion).
63 See United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1952). Although
it is true that the case was reversed because of an erroneous charge to the jury,
the court also stated that upon the evidence, a verdict should have been directed
because there was no evidence introduced to substantiate a finding that the
defendant was not entrapped. Ibid.
64 Ibid.
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will be overruled only upon presentment of evidence proving prior
illegal narcotics transactions may be drawn from these statements.
Conclusion
For the federal courts, the basic teaching on the entrapment
doctrine is to be found in the Supreme Court case of Sorrells v.
United States.65 Yet, in applying the rules as formulated in this
case, an appellate court has in one case upheld and in another re-
versed a conviction on substantially similar factual situations. Such
a glaring difference of opinion obviously requires that a more precise
standard be set by the Supreme Court. Although the authority of
law enforcement officers must be limited if adequate protection is to
be afforded to law abiding citizens, it is essential that the law itself
must be definite if these offici als are to know the scope of their
authority. Perhaps in granting certiorari in the Zi14ciale case, the
Supreme Court will avail itself of this opportunity to clarify the law
of entrapment in the federal courts.
CY PRES IN NEW Yo1iK
Testatrix executed' a will in 1934--and died in- 1938 a resident
of New York. By the terms of the will a trust was'created for the
benefit of testatrix' sister -for life'-vith renimindei 'to a- -haritable
hospital in Great Britain. The life tenant died in 1950 and the re-
mainder in trust ordinarily -'oufd have t'ss'ed. without .question
except that by 1948 the British government had takeitfile to all
hospital property and nationalized all medical services."- Is the hos-
pital still a charity within the intent of the testatrix as expressed in
the will and the surrounding circ'umstb nc? . r, -'do the"fa1ts make
appropriate an exercise by the court of its cy pres power? The
answer, as provided by the New York courts in two recent cases,'
makes timely an examination of current trends in the application of
the cy pres doctrine in New York.3
65287 U.S. 435 (1932).
See National Health Service Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEo. 6, c. 81; National
Health Service' (Scotland) Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEo, 6, c. 27.
2 Matter of Perkins, 2 A.D.2d 655, 152 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1st Dep't 1956);
Matter of Bishop, 1 A.D.2d 612, 152 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1st Dep't 1956).-
3 This note will be concerned mainly with cases decided after 1931 when
the surrogate's court was empowered to apply -cy pres.. The'cases before that
date are few. See Note, 39 COLUm. L. Rav. 1358 (1939).
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